- 1. For each of the following outcome matrices, find:
  - the evolutionarily stable strategies
  - the pure Nash equilibria
  - the strictly dominated strategies

2, 2	0, 3
3, 0	1, 1

1, 1	0, 0
0, 0	0, 0

2	,2	0,0	0,0
0	,0	0,0	1,1
0	,0	1,1	0,0

2. If s is evolutionarily stable, is (s, s) a Nash equilibrium?

3. If (s, s) is a Nash equilibrium, is s evolutionarily stable?

4. If s is evolutionarily stable, is it possible that another pure strategy  $s^*$  strongly dominates s?

5. If s is evolutionarily stable, is it possible that another strategy  $s^*$  is not strongly dominated by s?