- 1. Consider an alternative to the Borda method among n candidates:
  - first preference gets n-1 points

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• last preference gets 0 points

Can the winner ever be different than the winner using the original Borda method? Explain why or why not.

2. The following table provides the preferences of voters:

Number of Voters	7	5	6
$1^{st}$ choice	A	D	C
$2^{nd}$ choice	B	C	D
$3^{rd}$ choice	C	B	B
$4^{th}$ choice	D	A	A

- (a) Who is the plurality winner?
- (b) Who is the instant runoff winner?
- (c) Who is the Borda method winner?
- (d) Who will win if one uses the method of pairwise comparisons?
- 3. Consider an election with 3 candidates, A, B, and C. Describe a scenario in which the rankedvote, instant runoff winner is NOT the same as the Condorcet winner. (Your example will therefore show that ranked-vote, instant runoff does not satisfy the Condorcet criterion.)