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- There are two candidates
- 10% of the voters hold each position
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- Candidates will split the vote of views that are the same distance to both candidates
- Each candidate wants to maximize their share of the vote

Political Spectrum

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  - 3 does **not** dominate 2
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- If we iterate this, the candidates end up in the central positions
- This is **The Median Voter Theorem**
  "Majority rule voting will select the median preference"

Median Voter Theorem

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Examples:

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- Kennedy ('60)
- Nixon ('68)
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- Nixon ('68)
- Clinton ('92)
- Affordable Care Act
- Gas station distribution

Camping

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- ▶ Alex chooses east-west strip
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- ▶ Says Alex's payoff is the elevation, and Bob's payoff is the opposite

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- Problem: we're now stuck
- New idea: find points where no player regrets their choice

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- So, if all other players' fix their strategy, you can't do better

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    - Nash equilibria never lie on strictly dominated strategies
    - They can lie on weakly dominated strategies

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        - Other players will choose the corresponding equilibrium point