Mathematics and politics
Lecture notes, 2/18/03
Handing back essays on mathematics in society. All scores were between 17 and 20 out of 20.
Current assignments:
Today: Proof of O'Neill's Theorem
- Lemma A and Lemma B (full proofs)
- Proof of O'Neill's Theorem by induction
- Applications of the dollar auction model to real conflict
Lemmas for O'Neill's Theorem
- Lemma A: In the dollar auction with rational play and the conservative convention,
you should never exceed your previous bid by s units,
regardless of what the other player does.
Proof:
- We can prove the contrapositive: if you exceed your previous bid by s units, then
either you are not playing rationally (because you are losing money) or you are not using
the conservative convention.
- If your previous bid was x and you pass, then you will lose x.
- If your next bid is x+s or more, then you will either win or lose.
- If you end up
winning, you will have paid at least x+s for the stakes s and will lose at least
x. If you lose exactly x then you must not be using the conservative convention,
since that would have told you to pass (you lose x either way). If you lose more than
x then you must be playing irrationally.
- If you end up losing, you will lose your entire bid of at least x+s. So you must be
playing irrationally because you could have lost only x.
- Thus in either case you are either playing irrationally or not using the conservative convention.
End of proof
- Lemma B: In the dollar auction with rational play and the conservative convention,
if you can make a bid that exceeds your last bid by no more than (s-1) and results in a
pass by your opponent, then this is strictly better than passing or bidding higher.
Proof:
- We will prove this directly. First we prove that it's better than passing. Then we prove that
it's better than bidding higher. Suppose that your last bid was x and your next bid
is y.
If y is no higher than x+s-1 and your opponent passes,
then you will gain s and lose y, at most x+s-1. So the net result
is that you lose at most (x-1).
- If you had passed, you would lose x. So it is better to make
this bid than to pass.
- If you bid anything higher than y, you could either end up winning or losing.
- If you
bid higher than this and win, you gain s and lose at least y+1, which is strictly
worse than gaining s and losing y.
- If you bid higher than
this and lose, you'll lose at least y+1 and gain nothing, which is strictly worse than
losing y and gaining s.
- So we have shown that this bid is strictly better than passing or bidding higher.
End of proof.
Proof of O'Neill's Theorem
- Now we want to prove O'Neill's Theorem.
- Reminder: the idea behind the technique is called "proof by induction."
- Basic idea:
- The first step is easy.
- The second step is easy, if you already know the first step.
- The third step is easy, if you know the first and second step.
- etc.
- An analogy:
- Imagine you build a robot and program it to do two things: grab hold of a ladder,
and get from one step to the next.
- Clearly the robot can then climb a ladder of any height.
- So you don't have to program it to climb a ladder of any particular height.
- Actual method:
- Prove that the first step is true.
- Prove that the current step follows if you can assume that all the previous steps are
true.
- Then all steps must be true.
- Theorem (O'Neill, as presented by Taylor):
Suppose two players are bidding in the dollar auction and using the conservative
convention, with stakes s and bankroll b. Construct "special numbers" by the following procedure:
b, b - (s-1), b - 2(s-1), b - 3(s-1), etc.
If the other player has just bid x, then your optimal strategy is to:
- bid the smallest "special number" higher than x, if your old bid was
at least the previous "special number"; player two will then pass
- pass otherwise
- Proof:
- We use proof by induction. First prove the optimal strategy works for x=b.
Next, assume we have already proved that the strategy works for any bid player two makes
higher than x, and prove that it will also work for x.
-
The first step is if x is the highest possible bid,
so x=b. Of course we must pass. This is what the strategy tells us as well, since
there is no special number higher than b.
- Now suppose the induction hypothesis:
that for any bid more than x, the optimal strategy is to bid the next
special number if the previous bid was at least the previous special number, and pass otherwise.
- Suppose the first special number after x is Sp.
-
If we bid anything higher than
x but lower than Sp, player two can bid Sp.
- In fact, since Sp is the
next special number after whatever our new bid is, and since player two's old bid x is at least
the previous special number, that is exactly what s/he will do, by the induction hypothesis.
- When player two bids Sp, we will also look at the induction hypothesis, and it will
tell us to bid the next special number (which is Sp+s-1) if our previous bid was at least
Sp, and pass otherwise. Our previous bid was less than Sp, so we will pass. Thus
player two wins with a bid of Sp.
- This is not a good strategy for us. We lose our entire bid, which is larger
than x. This is worse than if we had passed and lost our old bid, smaller than x.
- If we bid Sp, player two will definitely pass, by the induction hypothesis again,
because his previous bid was lower than Sp. So we will win with Sp.
-
- If Sp
is no more than (s-1) higher than our previous bid, then by Lemma B it is better to bid
Sp than to pass or bid higher than Sp. By the previous bullet it is also better to
bid Sp than to bid something lower than Sp. So in this case we should bid Sp.
- If Sp is more than (s-1) higher than our previous bid, then by Lemma A we should
pass.
- So we have proven that the optimal strategy described in the theorem is correct if player two
has just bid x, given that it is correct for any bid higher than x.
- This completes the induction step.
- Thus the theorem is true for any bid x, since it is true for b and
its truth for all bids higher than x implies its truth for x.
End of proof
-
Corollary (O'Neill, as presented by Taylor):
If player one starts, then the optimal bid for player one is the smallest special number. Player two will then pass.
Proof:
This is the special case of O'Neill's theorem
when player two's previous bid was x=0; then we should bid the next
special number after that. The next special number after 0 is the smallest special number.
End of proof